Dent v. NFL LMRA 301 Preemption – The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Throws a Penalty Flag on the NFL by Trimachi, Justin C.
Golden Gate University Law Review 
Volume 51 
Issue 1 Ninth Circuit Survey Article 5 
March 2021 
Dent v. NFL LMRA 301 Preemption – The Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals Throws a Penalty Flag on the NFL 
Justin C. Trimachi 
Golden Gate University School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev 
 Part of the Labor and Employment Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Justin C. Trimachi, Dent v. NFL LMRA 301 Preemption – The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Throws a 
Penalty Flag on the NFL, 51 Golden Gate U. L. Rev. 25 (2021). 
https://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol51/iss1/5 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Academic Journals at GGU Law Digital Commons. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in Golden Gate University Law Review by an authorized editor of GGU Law Digital 
Commons. For more information, please contact jfischer@ggu.edu. 
NOTE
DENT V. NFL LMRA 301 PREEMPTION –
THE NINTH CIRCUIT COURT OF
APPEALS THROWS A PENALTY
FLAG ON THE NFL
JUSTIN C. TRIMACHI*
INTRODUCTION
The National Football League’s (“NFL”) logo is a shield with white
stars on a blue background on top and a white field with red lettering
below. This logo evokes the United States flag, a symbol meant to in-
spire a sense of civic responsibility and patriotism.1 In recent years the
NFL has strived to be identified with those ideals.2 One of the NFL’s
biggest stumbling blocks in achieving this goal has been the way the
league handles player health issues.3 In 2009 concerns over injuries led
the House Judiciary Committee to hold hearings.4  Ironically, recent de-
cisions from the Eighth and Eleventh Circuit Courts of Appeal shielded
the NFL from its responsibilities regarding medical decisions under state
law.5 Those courts ruled that Section 301 of the Labor Management Re-
* Juris Doctor Candidate, Golden Gate University School of Law, December 2021
1 See Flag of USA, https://statesymbolsusa.org/symbol-official-item/national-us/state-flag/
american-flag (last visited Sep. 13, 2020).
2 Brittainy Newman, The N.F.L. Wears Patriotism on Its Sleeve. And Its Head. And Its Feet,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 6, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/03/sports/football/nfl-patriotism.html.
3 Evan Grossman, Latest CTE Findings Just Another Blow to NFL’s Dubious History with
Head Injuries, DAILY NEWS (Jul. 30, 2017, 12:08 AM), https://www.nydailynews.com/sports/foot
ball/cte-findings-blow-nfl-bad-history-head-injuries-article-1.3368484.
4 Alan Schwarz, N.F.L. Scolded Over Injuries to Its Players, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 8, 2009),
https://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/29/sports/football/29hearing.html.
5 Atwater v. NFL Players Ass’n, 626 F.3d 1170 (11th Cir. 2010); Williams v. NFL, 582 F.3d
863 (8th Cir. 2009).
25
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lations Act (“LMRA 301”) preempted6 NFL players’ state-law tort
claims because resolution of the claims would require interpretation of
the terms of a Collective Bargaining Agreement (“CBA”).7 Both rulings
denied justice to the players who help make the NFL a profitable ven-
ture: one which generated approximately $15 billion during the 2018-
2019 season.8 The mythology created by the NFL every game day is that
the men on the field are warriors, heroes, and gladiators at the peak of
physical perfection. Unfortunately, once the cheers fade and retirement
looms, some players are left broken financially, physically, or both.9
Recently former players reveal an allegedly toxic culture that has
perpetrated over the years, with injuries being improperly treated leading
to long term negative effects.10 The players claim that this improper
treatment took the form of negligently prescribed opioids and painkil-
lers.11 Doctors supposedly handed these powerful drugs out to players in
unmarked envelopes.12 While trusting the doctors and taking these medi-
cations, the players were unaware of the long term ramifications.13
Richard Dent is a former defensive end14 for the Chicago Bears.15
He was voted MVP16 of Super Bowl XX in 1986, racking up three tack-
les, one and a half sacks, and two forced fumbles.17 His 2011 induction
6 The Supremacy Clause in Article VI of the United States Constitution declares that federal
law is the “supreme Law of the Land.” Article VI, CORNELL LAW LEGAL INFORMATION INSTITUTE,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution/articlevi. When federal and state law conflict federal law
supersedes, or preempts, state law. Preemption. CORNELL LAW LEGAL INFORMATION INSTITUTE,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/preemption. When a court finds that LMRA 301 preempts a state-
law claim, the courts will apply federal law based on federal labor policy. See Textile Workers
Union of Am. v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448, 455 (1957), See also Local 174 v. Lucas Flour
Co., 369 U.S. 95, 103-104 (1962).
7 Atwater, 626 F.3d at 1170; Williams, 582 F.3d at 863.
8 Gerry Smith & Bloomberg, NFL Bullish About $25 Billion Revenue Goal Ahead of Super
Bowl, FORTUNE (Feb. 2, 2019, 10:04 AM), https://fortune.com/2019/02/02/nfl-super-bowl-ad-reve-
nue/.






14 This position is a highly versatile role in football requiring size, speed, and skill. Ty
Schalter, Why Defensive End is the 2nd-Most Important Position in the NFL, BLEACHER REPORT
(July 2, 2020), https://bleacherreport.com/articles/1251690-why-defensive-end-is-the-second-most-
important-position-in-the-nfl.
15 Richard Dent, PRO FOOTBALL HALL OF FAME, https://www.profootballhof.com/players/
richard-dent/ (last visited Sep. 14, 2020).
16 Neil Greenberg, How the Super Bowl MVP is Chosen, WASHINGTON POST, (Feb. 2, 2020,
1:49 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/sports/2020/02/02/how-super-bowl-mvp-is-chosen/.
17 PRO FOOTBALL HALL OF FAME, supra note 15. (When Dent retired in 1997, his 137.5
career sack total was surpassed only by Reggie White and Bruce Smith, two legends of the game). A
fumble is when a team loses control of the football which results in the other team taking possession.
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into the Pro Football Hall of Fame cemented his legacy.18 Dent now has
an enlarged heart and nerve damage in his foot, resulting from his use of
painkillers during his career.19 According to Dent, painkillers and
opioids distributed by the NFL fueled his and other players’ ability to
stay on the field and perform at a high level.20 Dent and other star play-
ers are one of the main reasons why fans keep watching, a viewership
which fills the NFL’s coffers by keeping ad revenues high.21 Players
perform athletic feats that, at times, border on the superhuman. In 2014
Dent and other players brought allegations in federal court that NFL doc-
tors negligently distributed medications.22
In Dent v. NFL, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (“Ninth
Circuit”) determined that LMRA 301 did not preempt retired players’
state law tort claims because it was unnecessary to interpret the CBA to
resolve the claims.23 This finding conflicted with holdings by both the
Eight Circuit Court of Appeals (“Eighth Circuit”) in Williams v. NFL24
and the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals (“Eleventh Circuit”) in
Atwater v. NFL Players Association.25  In Dent, the Ninth Circuit ap-
plied a two-pronged test to determine if resolution of a state law tort
claim required interpretation of a CBA.26
The test used by the Ninth Circuit defined interpretation in depth,27
unlike the tests used by the other circuit courts in Williams and Atwater.
This key difference is likely why the Eight and Eleventh Circuit Courts
reached a different result than the Ninth Circuit. The test applied by the
Ninth Circuit should become the standard used by all federal courts go-
ing forward for all LMRA 301 preemption analysis for two reasons.
First, application of the Ninth Circuit’s test to the decisions in Williams
and Atwater will show that when interpretation is properly defined it
See Nat’l Football League, NFL Rulebook (2020) 4, https://operations.nfl.com/media/4349/2020-nfl-
rulebook.pdf.  A sack is a special type of tackle in which the quarterback is tackled behind the line of
scrimmage. This results in a loss of forward progress in advancing the football. See Are You Ready
for Some Football (Words)?, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/words-at-
play/football-super-bowl-words/sack.
18 Id.
19 Second Amended Complaint at 7, Dent v. NFL, No. 14-02324-WHA (N.D. Cal. Dec. 17,
2014), ECF No. 65.
20 See id. at 6.
21 Shawn M. Carter, NFL Commercial Score Big in 2019, pulling in $5B in revenue, FOX
BUSINESS (Jan 21, 2020), https://www.foxbusiness.com/sports/nfl-commercials-score-big-in-2019-
pulling-in-5-billion-in-revenue.
22 See Second Amended Complaint, supra note 19, at 27.
23 Dent v. NFL, 902 F.3d 1109, 1126 (9th Cir. 2018).
24 Williams v. NFL, 582 F.3d 863, 868 (8th Cir. 2009).
25 Atwater v. NFL Players Ass’n, 626 F.3d 1170, 1177 (11th Cir. 2010).
26 Dent, 902 F.3d at 1116.
27 Id.
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leads to a more consistent adjudication of LMRA 301 preemption. Sec-
ond, the Ninth Circuit’s test in Dent is more comprehensive, based on the
Supreme Court’s LMRA 301 jurisprudence, than those used by the
Eighth Circuit and Eleventh Circuit.
Part I of this Note will discuss the procedural history of the case, the
Ninth Circuit’s application of the two-pronged test to determine if
LMRA 301 preempted the players’ state-law claims, the facts of Dent v.
NFL, and finally a brief history of the NFL and its usage of CBAs.  Part
II will give a brief overview of the Supreme Court’s development of
LMRA 301 jurisprudence as well as its rulings on when LMRA 301
should preempt state-law tort claims. Part III will discuss the decisions
by the Eighth Circuit in Williams and by the Eleventh Circuit in Atwater.
Part IV of this Note will discuss why the Ninth Circuit’s test should be
adopted throughout the federal court system to analyze whether LMRA
301 preempts state-law claims.
I. RICHARD DENT SUITS UP ONE LAST TIME TO TACKLE THE NFL
This section will discuss the procedural history of the case followed
by the Ninth Circuit’s LMRA 301 analysis. Then the factual background
of Dent’s claims will be provided, followed by a brief historical discus-
sion of Collective Bargaining Agreements28 by the NFL to negotiate with
its players.
A. PROCEDURAL HISTORY – THE NFL BLOCKS DENT AND THE
NINTH CIRCUIT THROWS A PENALTY FLAG
In 2014, Dent filed a class action suit to represent a class of more
than 500 former players (collectively, the “Plaintiffs”) in the District
Court for the Northern District of California (“ND Court of CA”).29 The
Plaintiffs filed their complaint alleging the NFL violated state and federal
laws by distributing controlled substances and prescription drugs, both
negligently and on purpose.30
The Plaintiffs claimed that the NFL, in violation of federal drug
laws, breached its duty of care and negligently supplied them with
28 A collective bargaining agreement is a written legal contract between an employer and a
union representing the employees. What is a Collective Bargaining Agreement, SHRM, https://
www.shrm.org/resourcesandtools/tools-and-samples/hr-qa/pages/collectivebargainingagree
ment.aspx (last visited Sept. 14, 2020).
29 See Complaint at 2, Dent v. NFL, No. 14-02324-WHA (N.D. Cal. Dec. 17, 2014), ECF No.
1; see also Second Amended Complaint, Dent v. NFL, No. 14-02324-WHA (N.D. Cal. Dec. 17,
2014), ECF No. 65.
30 Complaint, infra note 31 at 78-79.
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opioids and other pain medications.31 Further, the Plaintiffs maintained
that instead of properly treating injuries, NFL doctors encouraged the
Players to take the pills before, during, and after games to manage the
pain.32 The Plaintiffs filed several claims, including negligence per se
under California state law.33 In response, the NFL filed a motion to dis-
miss, arguing that LMRA 301 preempted the Plaintiffs’ state-law tort
claims.34 The ND Court of CA agreed and granted the motion.35 Judge
Alsup ruled that he would need to construe, consult, and apply provisions
of the CBA surrounding the NFL’s oversight of individual team physi-
cians.36 For this reason he held that LMRA 301 preempted the negli-
gence claim.37 The Plaintiffs appealed, and the Ninth Circuit granted de
novo review.38
B. THE NINTH CIRCUIT RULED THAT LMRA 301 DID NOT PREEMPT
DENT’S CLAIMS BECAUSE NO INTERPRETATION OF THE CBA
WAS REQUIRED
In Dent, The Ninth Circuit laid out a two-step process for analyzing
whether or not LMRA 301 preempted a state-law claim.39 First, the court
would determine whether the cause of action involved “rights conferred
upon an employee by virtue of state law, not by a CBA.”40 If the right
solely existed as a result of the CBA, the court would deem the claim
preempted with no further analysis.41
Second, the court must determine if interpretation of the CBA was
required and assess “whether litigating the state law claim nonetheless
requires interpretation of a CBA, such that resolving the entire claim in
court threatens the proper role of grievance and arbitration.”42 If the
court determined that resolution of the claim required interpretation of
31 See id. at 6.
32 See id.
33 Id. at 65-86.
34 See Defendant National Football League’s Notice of Motion and Motion to Dismiss Sec-
ond Amended Complaint at 15, Dent v. NFL, No. 14-02324-WHA (N.D. Cal. Dec. 17, 2014), ECF
No. 72.
35 Order re. Motions to Dismiss and Requests for Judicial Notice at 22, Dent v. NFL, No. 14-
02324-WHA (N.D. Cal. Dec. 17, 2014), ECF No. 106.
36 See Dent v. NFL, No. C 14-02324 WHA, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 174448 at *22-24, (N.D.
Cal. Dec. 17, 2014).
37 Id. at *36.
38 Dent v. NFL, 902 F.3d 1109, 1116 (9th Cir. 2018).
39 Id.
40 Id (quoting Burnside v. Kiewit Pac. Corp., 491 F.3d 1053, 1059 (9th Cir. 2007)).
41 Id.
42 Id. (quoting Alaska Airlines Inc. v. Schurke, 898 F.3d 904, 921 (9th Cir. 2018) (en banc)).
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the CBA then LMRA 301 would preempt the claim.43 The Ninth Cir-
cuit’s analysis was largely focused on the negligence per se44 claim, but
the players also filed claims of negligent misrepresentation, fraud, loss of
consortium, fraudulent concealment, and negligent hiring and retention.45
The Plaintiffs’ original complaint filed with the ND Court of CA
claimed that the NFL violated federal and California law by providing
and administering controlled substances without (1) warnings of long-
term risks and side-effects, (2) proper labeling, or (3) written prescrip-
tions.46 The Ninth Circuit first assessed if the Plaintiffs right to proper
medical care was granted solely by the CBAs.47 The Court determined
that nothing in the CBA required the NFL to provide medical care to the
Plaintiffs.48 The Court stated that the Plaintiffs were not claiming that the
NFL violated the CBA, but rather state and federal law.49 Based on this
the Ninth Circuit determined that the right did not solely arise from the
CBA.50 The Ninth Circuit then analyzed each element of the Plaintiffs’
negligence claim to determine if interpretation of the CBA was required
to resolve the Plaintiffs’ claim.51
First, the Ninth Circuit determined that no duty was established by
statute or the CBA regarding distribution of pain medication from doc-
tors to the Plaintiffs.52 The Court instead found that a binding duty was
inherent in the distribution of opioids and painkillers.53 Next, Judge Tall-
man found that harm was foreseeable from the overuse or misuse of con-
trolled substances.54 He stated that carelessness in handling such
substances is both “illegal and morally blameworthy.”55
43 Id. (citing Burnside v. Kiewit Pac. Corp., 491 F.3d 1053, 1059 (9th Cir. 2007)).
44 Negligence per se in California is defined by four elements: (1) the defendant violated a
statute, ordinance, or regulation; (2) the violation proximately caused death or injury to person or
property; (3) the death or injury resulted from an occurrence the nature of which the stat-
ute, ordinance, or regulation was designed to prevent; and (4) the person suffering the death or the
injury to his person or property was one of the class of persons for whose protection the statute,
ordinance, or regulation was adopted. Alcala v. Vazmar Corp, 167 Cal. App. 4th 747, 755 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2d 2008).
45 Dent, 902 F.3d at 1115.
46 Second Amended Complaint at 81-83, Dent v. NFL, No. 14-02324-WHA (N.D. Cal. Dec.
17, 2014), ECF No. 65.
47 Dent, 902 F.3d at 1118.
48 Id.
49 See Second Amended Complaint, infra note 50 at 81-83.
50 Dent, 902 F.3d at 1118.
51 Id.
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Finally, the Ninth Circuit determined the responsible distribution of
prescription drugs did not unduly burden the NFL.56 For this reason, if
the NFL was distributing controlled substances to the Plaintiffs, it had a
duty to do so with reasonable care.57 This duty arose from the general
character of that activity, and not the Collective Bargaining Agreement
(“CBA”).58 Therefore Judge Tallman determined that a court need only
compare the conduct of the NFL to the requirements of state and federal
law.59 This comparison would determine if the Plaintiffs’ harm was fore-
seeable and if the NFL breached its duty of care in distributing prescrip-
tion drugs.60
Regarding causation, the Ninth Circuit found that it was purely a
question of fact whether the NFL failed in its duty to safely prescribe
painkillers and opioids.61 Therefore no interpretation of the CBA was
necessary to assess the alleged violation of the statutes by the NFL.62
The Ninth Circuit then distinguished the current case from Williams,
where the Eighth Circuit ruled it could not resolve the plaintiffs’ negli-
gence claims without evaluating the CBA’s drug policy.63 In contrast
with that decision, the Ninth Circuit found that the NFL’s duty to respon-
sibly distribute drugs was completely independent of the CBA.64 There-
fore, no interpretation was necessary and LMRA 301 did not preempt the
claims.65 The Ninth Circuit remanded the case to the ND Court of CA to
hear the claim on its merits.66
C. FACTUAL BACKGROUND OF DENT
Dent and the Plaintiffs alleged that while playing in the NFL, they
were given an abundance of various medications and opioids by NFL
doctors.67 The Plaintiffs claimed that NFL doctors distributed these drugs
to keep the star players on the field to maintain ad revenues and ticket
sales.68 The Plaintiffs also asserted that NFL doctors accomplished this




59 Id. at 1120.
60 See id.
61 Id. at 1119-20.
62 Id.
63 Id at 1120.
64 Id.
65 Id.
66 Id. at 1126.
67 Second Amended Complaint at 6, Dent v. NFL, No. 14-02324-WHA (N.D. Cal. Dec. 17,
2014), ECF No. 65.
68 See id. at 74.
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injuries.69 The Plaintiffs also stated the NFL increased their risk of injury
by shortening the offseason and adding more games to the schedule.70
The plaintiffs maintained that written prescriptions rarely accompa-
nied the drugs.71 Instead, they were handed various pills in manila enve-
lopes with no labeling or instructions.72 The Plaintiffs stated that the
NFL failed to warn them that the continued use of such strong medica-
tions could result in negative side effects, long term health issues, or
addiction.73 Additionally, many players took these drugs, without a pre-
scription or instruction, for an extended period of time.74 This negligent
distribution of opioids and other painkillers, according to the Plaintiffs,
led to orthopedic injuries, heart problems, severe physical ailments, and
drug addiction.75
D. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE NFL AND ITS USE OF COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING AGREEMENTS
The NFL was founded in 192076 and operates as an unincorporated
association of individually owned football teams.77 The NFL “promotes,
organizes, and regulates professional football in the United States.”78
Players are not employees of the NFL because they sign contracts with
the individual teams.79 A group of players, led by Creighton Miller, the
first general manager for the Cleveland Browns, founded the National
Football League Players Association (“NFLPA”) in 1956.80 The
NFLPA’s purpose was to provide a counterbalance to the power of the
NFL by improving pay and working conditions for the players.81 Since
1968, a series of Collective Bargaining Agreements has defined the rela-
tionship among the NFL, its member teams, and NFL players.82
69 Id. at 6.
70 See id. at 3-4.
71 Id. at 53.
72 Id.
73 Id. at 13-14.
74 Id. at 7-13.
75 Id.
76 National Football League, BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/topic/National-Foot-
ball-League (last visited Oct. 3, 2020).
77 Williams v. NFL, 582 F.3d 863, 868 (8th Cir. 2009).
78 Id.
79 Dent, 902 F.3d at 1114.
80 1956: The Beginning, NFLPA, https://nflpa.com/about/history/1956-the-beginning (last
visited Sep. 12, 2020).
81 See id.
82 See Dent, 902 F.3d at 1114.
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II. THE SUPREME COURT’S JURISPRUDENCE ON LMRA 301
PREEMPTION AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO STATE-LAW TORT
CLAIMS
This section will discuss how the Supreme Court (“SCOTUS”) de-
cided which law should apply when resolving LMRA 301 disputes. It
will then discuss the framework created by SCOTUS to determine when
LMRA 301 preempts state-law tort claims. Finally, this section will re-
view SCOTUS’ holdings that to refer or look to the terms of a CBA is
not interpretation for the purposes of LMRA 301 analysis.
In 1957 the lower federal courts were split regarding their role under
LMRA 301.83 LMRA 301 provides that any United States District Court
may hear suit involving a contract dispute between an employer and a
labor organization.84 Such a suit does not require a party to meet either
the amount in controversy or diversity of citizenship requirements.85 In
Textile Workers Union of Am. v. Lincoln Mills of Alabama, SCOTUS
granted certiorari to determine the role of the courts in relation to LMRA
301.86
In Textile Workers, a union requested arbitration with the company
to resolve a dispute concerning workloads and work assignments.87 The
employer refused arbitration so the union brought suit to compel arbitra-
tion.88 SCOTUS noted that LMRA 301 had the purpose of maintaining
industrial peace.89 Justice Douglas highlighted that Congress intended to
assign enforcement of CBAs on behalf of or against labor organizations
to the federal courts.90 SCOTUS held that federal law must be applied to
resolve CBA disputes under LMRA 301.91 The federal courts would be
responsible to create that law utilizing the policy of national labor laws.92
SCOTUS applied this holding to state courts as well in Local 174 v.
Lucas Flour Co.93
At issue in Lucas was a strike by a labor union to force a company
to rehire an employee.94 As a result the company sued, claiming damages
83 Textile Workers Union of Am. v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448, 449 (1957).
84 Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, LMRA 301(a), 29 U.S.C. §185(a) (2020).
85 See id.
86 Textile Workers, 353 U.S. at 449.
87 Id.
88 Id.
89 Id. at 455.
90 Id.
91 Id. at 456.
92 Id. at 457.
93 Local 174 v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 102 (1962).
94 Id. at 97.
9
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for business losses that resulted from the strike.95 The Supreme Court of
Washington held that the strike violated the CBA because of a provision
that required both parties to resolve disputes through arbitration.96
SCOTUS agreed even though the CBA did not contain an explicit no-
strike clause.97 Despite affirming the state court’s ruling, Justice Stewart
found that the application of state law was improper.98 He determined
that federal law must be applied to any claim brought in state court re-
garding an alleged violation of a CBA.99 He reasoned that this served the
dual purpose of simplifying the agreements’ interpretation and avoiding
prolonged disputes.100 In Allis-Chambers Corp. v. Lueck, SCOTUS held
that LMRA 301 preempts any rights conferred by state law that do not
exist independently of a CBA.101
The dispute in Lueck arose when a union worker filed a tort suit in
Wisconsin State Court.102 The worker claimed that both his employer
and the insurance company improperly handled his payments resulting
from a disability claim.103 However, the employee did not follow the
grievance and arbitration process defined by the terms of the CBA.104
SCOTUS found that LMRA 301 preempted a state-law tort claim if eval-
uation of that claim was so enmeshed with the terms of a labor con-
tract.105 SCOTUS reversed the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s ruling in
Lueck’s favor because Lueck’s right was solely provided by the CBA.106
Justice Blackmun also noted that SCOTUS did not hold that LMRA 301
would preempt all state-law claims that had a connection to the terms of
a CBA.107  He further explained that for LMRA 301 to preempt a state-
law tort claim, the claim’s resolution must substantially depend on an
analysis of the terms of a CBA.108 SCOTUS later granted certiorari in
Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef to resolve a circuit split and ex-
panded on the ruling in Lueck.109
95 Id.
96 Id. at 97-98.
97 Id. at 105.
98 Id. at 103.
99 Id. at 103.
100 Id. at 104.
101 Allis-Chambers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 213 (1985).
102 Id.
103 Id. at 205.
104 See id. at 206.
105 Id. at 213.
106 See id. at 220.
107 See id.
108 Id.
109 Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, 486 U.S. 399, 403 (7th Cir. 1988) (ruling that to
resolve a retaliatory discharge claim required interpretation of a CBA because it would require the
10
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In Lingle, an employee claimed that her employer wrongfully dis-
charged her in retaliation for filing a workers’ compensation claim for
her injuries.110 SCOTUS reversed the lower court’s ruling in favor of the
employer because the remedy for the state-law claim was independent of
the CBA since a purely factual inquiry could resolve the claim.111
Justice Stevens stated that a CBA’s protection may provide a rem-
edy for conduct that simultaneously violates state law.112 However, he
found that such an occurrence would not make the existence of a state-
law violation dependent on the terms of the CBA.113 He also determined
that a claim is independent of a CBA, for the purposes of LMRA 301
preemption analysis, if a purely factual inquiry independent of the terms
of the CBA will resolve the claim.114 He then concluded that LMRA 301
preemption merely establishes federal law as the basis for interpreting
CBAs.115 Justice Stevens finally noted that resolution of a state-law
claim, through either the terms of a CBA or rights granted by state law,
could rely on the same set of facts for analysis.116 However, he found
that that this was not enough to find that such a claim is substantially
dependent on a CBA for the purposes of LMRA 301 preemption analy-
sis.117 In Livadas v. Bradshaw, SCOTUS laid the foundation for the
Ninth Circuit’s definition of “interpretation.”118
At issue in Livadas was whether the California Division of Labor
Standards Enforcement (“Division”) could adjudicate a dispute between
Livadas and her employer.119 The Division claimed that it could not be-
cause Livadas was subject to a CBA between the union and the em-
ployer.120 Further, the Division claimed § 229 of the California Labor
Code (“Code”)121 prohibited it from resolving the claim.122 The Division
stated it would have to look to and apply the CBA to determine to estab-
same analysis of the facts, standing in contrast to similar cases in the Second, Tenth, and Third
Circuits).
110 Id. at 401.
111 Id. at 407.
112 See id. at 412-13.
113 See id. at 413.
114 See id. at 407.
115 Id. at 409.
116 Id. at 409-410.
117 See id. at 410.
118 Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107 (1994).
119 Id. at 112.
120 Id. at 113.
121 Actions to enforce the provisions of this article for the collection of due and unpaid wages
claimed by an individual may be maintained without regard to the existence of any private agree-
ment to arbitrate. This section shall not apply to claims involving any dispute concerning the inter-
pretation or application of any collective bargaining agreement containing such an arbitration
agreement. Cal. Lab. Code § 229.
122 Id.
11
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lish what rate Livadas should be paid under § 203123 of the Code.124
SCOTUS ruled that the Division could not decide on its own to unilater-
ally reject arbitration claims without a LMRA 301 preemption analy-
sis.125 Therefore the ruling of the lower court was reversed in favor of
Livadas.126 Justice Souter reasoned that a simple need to look to the
terms of a CBA is not interpretation for the purposes of LMRA 301 pre-
emption analysis.127  Drawing on the decisions in Lucas, Lueck, Lingle,
and Livadas, the Ninth Circuit developed its two-pronged test, with its
expanded definition of interpretation, and then applied that test to the
claims in Dent.128 The Ninth Circuit held that LMRA 301 did not pre-
empt the plaintiffs’ claims because no interpretation of a CBA was re-
quired.129 The Ninth Circuit noted that its decision contrasted with recent
holdings by both the Eighth Circuit and Eleventh Circuit on whether
LMRA 301 preempted the plaintiffs’ state-law claims.130
III. DENT’S HOLDING CLASHES WITH DECISIONS BY THE EIGHTH AND
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT COURTS OF APPEAL
This section will look at two cases similar to Dent involving NFL
players. The first, Williams v. NFL,131 was decided by the Eight Circuit.
The second, Atwater v. NFL Players Ass’n,132 was decided by the Elev-
enth Circuit.  In both Atwater and Williams, the court held that LMRA
301 preempted the state-law tort claims and ruled in favor of the
defendants.
123 [I]f an employer willfully fails to pay, without abatement or reduction . . . any wages of an
employee who is discharged or who quits, the wages of the employee shall continue as a penalty
from the due date thereof at the same rate until paid or until an action therefor is commenced. Cal.
Lab. Code § 203.
124 Livadas, 512 U.S. at 112-13.
125 See id. at 134.
126 Id. at 135.
127 See id. at 125 (determining that any need to merely “look to” or “refer” to the CBA was
not necessary to resolve the dispute).
128 Dent v. NFL, 902 F.3d 1109, 1116 (9th Cir. 2018).
129 Id.
130 Id. at 1124.
131 Williams v. NFL, 582 F.3d 863 (8th Cir. 2009).
132 Atwater v. NFL Players Ass’n, 626 F.3d 1170 (11th Cir. 2010).
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A. THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT HOLDS THAT LMRA 301 PREEMPTED NFL
PLAYERS’ STATE-LAW TORT CLAIMS BECAUSE
INTERPRETATION OF A CBA WAS NECESSARY TO
RESOLVE THE PLAINTIFFS’ CLAIMS
In Williams v. NFL, the Eighth Circuit considered if LMRA 301
preempted the plaintiffs’ Minnesota common law claims, which included
negligence and misrepresentation.133 Central to the case was the Policy
on Anabolic Steroids and Related Substances (“Policy”), incorporated in
the NFL Collective Bargaining Agreement 2006-2012.134 The Policy in-
cluded language regarding banned substances and testing policies.135 The
plaintiffs were warned that the risk of taking supplements was theirs, and
were told they were ultimately responsible for what went into their bod-
ies.136 In 2006, several players tested positive for bumetanide, which is a
banned substance under the policy.137 An investigation linked the results
to a supplement called StarCaps.138 NFL teams, along with the plaintiffs’
agents, received memos with warnings and new policies regarding Star-
Caps.139 However, the NFL did not directly notify the plaintiffs.140 These
memos did not state that StarCaps contained bumetanide or any other
banned substances, or that the Policy banned StarCaps.141
The plaintiffs tested positive in 2008 for bumetanide and the NFL
suspended them for four games without pay.142 During an arbitration
hearing, the plaintiffs admitted they were aware of the warnings regard-
ing supplements, the supplement hotline, and the rule from the Policy
that each player is responsible for what goes into his body.143 Regardless,
the plaintiffs claimed that the NFL’s failure to notify them specifically
about the bumetanide in StarCaps should have excused their positive test
results.144 The plaintiffs filed suit in Minnesota District Court for the
Fourth District on December 3, 2008, alleging various violations of Min-
nesota common law including: breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, negligent
misrepresentation, negligence, and vicarious liability.145 The Eighth Cir-
133 Williams, 582 F.3d at 868.
134 Id.
135 Id. at 868-69.
136 Id. at 869. The Policy emphasized this warning in capital letters.
137 Id.
138 Id.
139 Id. at 869-70.
140 See id.
141 Id. at 870.
142 Id.
143 Id. at 871.
144 Id.
145 Id. at 872 n.7.
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cuit upheld the district court’s ruling that LMRA 301 preempted the
suit’s state-law tort claims.146
The Eighth Circuit applied a two-pronged test to determine if
LMRA 301 preempted the plaintiffs’ state-law tort claims.147 LMRA 301
would preempt those claims if the “claims: (1) [were] premised on duties
created by the relevant CBA such that they are ‘based on’ the  agree-
ment, or (2) require interpretation of the CBA such that they [were] ‘de-
pendent upon an analysis’ of the agreement.”148
Judge Shepherd gave two reasons for LMRA 301 preemption of the
plaintiffs’ negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, and gross negligence
claims.149 First, it was necessary to examine and determine the parties’
relationship and expectations established by the CBA and the Policy.150
Second, the claims were “inextricably intertwined with consideration of
the terms of the Policy.”151 Similarly, he found that federal law pre-
empted the plaintiffs other state-law tort claims because it would not be
possible to resolve the claims without interpretation of the CBA and the
Policy.152 Judge Shepherd primarily relied on the language assigning the
plaintiffs’ responsibility to control what went into their bodies.153 This
reasoning mirrored Atwater, where the Eleventh Circuit assigned respon-
sibility to the players for managing their finances.154
B. THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT HOLDS THAT LMRA 301 PREEMPTED NFL
PLAYERS’ STATE-LAW TORT CLAIMS BECAUSE
INTERPRETATION OF A CBA WAS NECESSARY TO
RESOLVE THE PLAINTIFFS’ CLAIMS
In Atwater v. NFL Players Association, the plaintiffs alleged negli-
gence and misrepresentation under Georgia state law by the National
Football League and the National Football League Players Association
(“NFLPA”). Specifically, the plaintiffs cited defendants’ failure to prop-
erly vet Kirk Wright and Nelson “Keith” Bond, who operated the Inter-
national Management Association (“IMA”), for participation in the
Financial Advisors Program (“Program”).155 The plaintiffs claimed the
defendant’s failure led to Wright’s theft of almost $20 million from the
146 Id. at 868.
147 Id. at 881.





153 See id. at 882.
154 See Atwater v. NFL Players Ass’n, 626 F.3d 1170, 1183 (11th Cir. 2010).
155 See id. at 1174.
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plaintiffs’ accounts.156 The Eleventh Circuit used the following test to
assess whether LMRA 301 preempted the plaintiffs’ claims: “If the state-
law claim either arises out of a CBA or is dependent upon the meaning of
a CBA, ‘the application of state law . . . is preempted and federal labor-
law principles . . . must be employed to resolve the dispute.’”157
The defendants argued that LMRA 301 preempted the plaintiffs’
claims because they substantially depended on an interpretation of sec-
tion 12 of the CBA, which established and defined the Career Planning
Program (“CPP”).158 The CPP, according to the CBA, would provide
information to the players on how to handle their personal finances, but it
would not assume responsibility for those finances.159 The defendants
argued that because they both provided this warning and conducted back-
ground checks in compliance with the CPP they were not liable for
Wright’s actions.160
The plaintiffs alleged that the NFLPA failed to exercise reasonable
care while performing due diligence background checks on Wright,
Bond, and IMA.161 The plaintiffs maintained that the NFLPA failed by
(1) not evaluating IMA’s application properly, and (2) inadequately mon-
itoring IMA’s compliance with the Program.162 Judge Ebel determined
that the defendant’s duties were created by the CBA’s mandate given to
the defendants to create the CPP and “provid[e] information to players
on handling their personal finances.”163 To support this conclusion, he
cited undisputed evidence that fulfilled the NFLPA’s obligations to pro-
vide information on handling personal finances to the players.164 This
evidence consisted of statements from the NFLPA’s general counsel that
the Program was part of the CPP mandated by the CBA.165
The plaintiffs disputed this evidence linking the Program and the
CPP in three ways: (1) by introducing statements from the NFLPA to the
Securities and Exchange Commission when discussing the Program, (2)
by citing the NFLPA’s failure to mention the CPP when approving the
program, and (3) by pointing to the lack of evidence of the existence of
156 See id.
157 Id. at 1176-77 (quoting Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 406
(1988)).
158 Id. at 1174.
159 Id. at 1174-75.
160 See id. at 1175.
161 First Amended Complaint at 27, Atwater v. NFL Players Ass’n, No. 1:06-CV-1510-JEC
(N.D. Ga., Mar. 26, 2009), ECF No. 10.
162 Id.
163 Atwater, 626 F.3d at 1179 (citing Motion for Summary Judgement at 80, Atwater v. NFL
Players Ass’n, No. 1:06-CV-1510-JEC (N.D. Ga., Mar. 26, 2009), ECF No. 180).
164 See id. at 1179-80.
165 Id. at 1180.
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the CPP.166 The plaintiffs also claimed that the NFL failed in its duty to
provide proper background checks and to act reasonably and compe-
tently in providing background information about the advisors.167 The
plaintiffs argued that they reasonably relied on the Program as a fully-
insured and validated financial investment option.168
The Eleventh Circuit was unpersuaded and ruled that any claims of
negligence required interpretation of the personal finance provision of
the CBA to determine the scope of any duty owed by the NFL.169 Re-
garding the other state-law claims, the court would likewise need to  in-
terpret the personal finance provision of the CBA.170 For these reasons,
the Eleventh Circuit ruled that LMRA 301 preempted the plaintiffs’
state-law claims and granted summary judgment to both defendants.171
These holdings reflected the decision in Williams, where the Eight Cir-
cuit determined it would have to interpret the CBA’s language assigning
responsibility to the players for substances found in their bodies.172 The
decisions in Williams and Atwater reveal the need for a consistent, robust
test for LMRA 301 preemption analysis. Such a test must include the
Supreme Court’s definition of what constitutes CBA interpretation for
the purposes of LMRA 301 preemption analysis. This will help ensure
that a tenuous reliance on the terms of a CBA will not preempt rights
granted to employees by state law. The Ninth Circuit provided such a test
in Dent.173
IV. THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S TEST SHOULD BE ADOPTED THROUGHOUT
THE FEDERAL COURT SYSTEM
In Dent, the Ninth Circuit used a two-pronged test to analyze
whether LMRA 301 preempted the plaintiffs’ state-law tort claims.174
First it determined if the right claimed existed by virtue of state law or
arose solely as a result of a CBA.175 If the right was conferred by a CBA,
then LMRA 301 preempted the claim with no further analysis needed.176
Second, if the right is determined to be independent of a CBA, the court
166 Id. at 1180.
167 First Amended Complaint at 30, Atwater v. NFL Players Ass’n, No. 1:06-CV-1510-JEC
(N.D. Ga., Mar. 26, 2009), ECF No. 10.
168 See Atwater, 626 F.3d at 1182-83.
169 Id. at 1182.
170 Id. at 1182-84.
171 Id. at 1185.
172 See Williams v. NFL, 582 F.3d 863, 882 (8th Cir. 2009).
173 Dent, 902 F.3d at 1116.
174 Id. at 1116.
175 Id. (quoting Burnside v. Kiewit Pac. Corp., 491 F.3d 1053, 1059 (9th Cir. 2007)).
176 Id.
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must analyze if resolution of the claim requires interpretation of a CBA
to avoid threatening the proper role of grievance and arbitration.177
Judge Tallman explained that LMRA 301 preempts a claim that re-
quires interpretation of a CBA.178 He also noted that interpretation is
construed narrowly; it means something more than considering, referring
to, or applying the language of a CBA.179 Finally he stated that the need
for a purely factual inquiry that does not rely on the meaning of any CBA
provision is not cause for LMRA 301 preemption.180
The discussion below will show that the Ninth Circuit’s test for
LMRA 301 preemption fully integrates the Supreme Court’s LMRA ju-
risprudence in Lucas Flour, Lingle, Livadas, and Lueck. Applying the
Ninth Circuit’s test to the facts presented in Williams and Atwater will
show that the claims could have been resolved without interpretation of a
CBA. Finally, contrasting the Ninth Circuit’s test with those used by the
Eighth Circuit in Williams and the Eleventh Circuit in Atwater will show
that it is a more holistic representation of the Supreme Court’s LMRA
301 preemption jurisprudence. For these reasons, the federal court sys-
tem should adopt the Ninth Circuit’s test.
A. APPLYING THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S TEST TO WILLIAMS AND
ATWATER SHOWS THAT JUSTICE COULD HAVE BEEN
OBTAINED FOR THE PLAINTIFFS WITHOUT
INTERPRETATION OF A CBA
1. Applying the Ninth Circuit Test to Williams v. NFL
In Williams, the Eighth Circuit held that LMRA 301 preempted the
Plaintiffs’ state-law claims of negligence, gross negligence, and breach
of fiduciary duty.181 However, if the Eighth Circuit had applied the Ninth
Circuit’s two-pronged test, the outcome of the case would likely have
been different. First, the claims did not arise solely from the CBA, nor
was an interpretation of the CBA necessary to resolve the claims.
The Ninth Circuit’s test states that a court must first determine if the
plaintiffs’ rights arose solely from the CBA or were conferred under state
law.182 The Eighth Circuit ruled that any duty owed by the NFL or its
doctors required an examination of the legal relationship between the
177 Id. (quoting Alaska Airlines Inc. v. Schurke, 898 F.3d 904, 921 (9th Cir. 2018)).
178 Id. (quoting Burnside v. Kiewit Pac. Corp., 491 F.3d 1053, 1059 (9th Cir. 2007)).
179 Id. (quoting Alaska Airlines Inc. v. Schurke, 898 F.3d 904, 921 (9th Cir. 2018)).
180 Id. (quoting Burnside v. Kiewit Pac. Corp., 491 F.3d 1053, 1072 (9th Cir. 2007)).
181 Williams v. NFL, 582 F.3d 863, 881 (8th Cir. 2009).
182 Dent v. NFL, 902 F.3d 1109, 1116 (9th Cir. 2018).
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parties established by the CBA.183 The court explained that the claims
were “inextricably intertwined with consideration of the terms of the
CBA’s Policy on Anabolic Steroids and Related Substances (“Pol-
icy”).”184 However, since Minnesota requires its doctors to obtain a li-
cense to practice medicine, and to keep their license or avoid censure,
doctors are required to meet specific standards under state law whether
or not the patient is a party to a CBA.185 Therefore, the doctors’ duty was
assigned independently of the CBA. The NFL employed the doctors in-
volved, thus under the doctrine of respondeat superior186 the NFL was
responsible for their actions. For these reasons, the rights granted to the
plaintiffs did not solely arise from the CBA. If a right is independent of a
CBA, a court must determine if an interpretation of the CBA is necessary
to resolve the claims.187 Interpretation means more than to consider, refer
to, or apply.188
The Eighth Circuit relied on the fact that the Policy, incorporated
into the CBA, contained language that directed the plaintiffs to a hotline
to obtain information about supplements and advised them they were
solely responsible for what went into their bodies.189 However, the
court’s analysis was flawed because merely referring to language in a
CBA that does not meet the standard of interpretation defined by the
Supreme Court and later adopted by the Ninth Circuit. It would have
been possible to read the Policy language and analyze any duties as-
signed to doctors or plaintiffs using Minnesota common law through a
purely factual inquiry to determine if the plaintiffs’ tort claims were
valid.
LMRA 301 preemption requires more than a casual reference to the
language of a CBA that is simply understood.190 The phrase “at your
own risk” is similar to the phrase caveat emptor (“let the buyer beware”),
both of which are understood and taken at face value. Similarly, the lan-
guage from the Policy “you and you alone are still responsible for what
183 See Williams, 582 F.3d at 881.
184 Id. at 881 (citing Bogan v. Gen. Motors Corp., 500 F.3d 828, 832 (8th Cir. 2007)) (inter-
nal quotations omitted).
185 See MINN. STAT. § 147.001 (2019).
186 “Latin – Let the chief answer. A superior is responsible for any acts of omission or com-
mission by a person of less responsibility to him.” What is Respondeat Superior?, L. DICTIONARY,
https://thelawdictionary.org/respondeat-superior/ (last visited Aug. 12, 2020).
187 Dent, 902 F.3d at 1116 (9th Cir. 2018) (citing Alaska Airlines Inc. v. Schurke., 898 F.3d
904, 921 (9th Cir. 2018) (en banc)).
188 Id.
189 Williams, 582 F.3d 863 at 869.
190 See Dent, 902 F.3d at 1116 (9th Cir. 2018) (citing Alaska Airlines Inc. v. Schurke, 898
F.3d 904, 921 (9th Cir. 2018) (en banc)).
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goes into your body”191 is also straightforward.  An in-depth analysis of
these statements is unnecessary because a purely factual inquiry could be
conducted to determine any duty owed. Such an inquiry could draw on
testimony regarding the parties’ intentions, as well as the memos and
communication from the NFL to the plaintiffs.
The plaintiffs’ rights existed by virtue of Minnesota common law
and did not solely arise from a CBA. Additionally, interpretation of the
Policy and the CBA’s language was not necessary to resolve their state-
law claims. For these reasons, under the test used in Dent, LMRA 301
should not have preempted the state-law claims at issue in Williams. An
application of the same test should also have produced a different out-
come in Atwater v. NFL, because resolution of the plaintiffs’ claims did
not require interpretation of a CBA.192
2. Applying the Ninth Circuit Test to Atwater v. NFL Players
Association
In Atwater, the Eleventh Circuit held that LMRA 301 preempted the
plaintiffs’ state-law claims. The court reasoned resolution of the claims
substantially depended on an interpretation of the Collective Bargaining
Agreement (“CBA”) between the parties.193 However, an application of
the Dent test will show that LMRA 301 should not have preempted the
plaintiffs’ state-law claims. The court relied on section 12 of the CBA,194
which mandated the creation of the Career Planning Program (“CPP”)
and provided the warning that players had sole responsibility for their
finances.195
The scope of any duty owed by the defendants did not arise solely
from the CBA because section 12 of the CPP did not explicitly create the
Financial Advisors Program (“Program”).196 None of the terms found in
section 12 addressed the requirements for admission, background checks
for advisors wishing to participate, or ensuring compliance with the Pro-
gram.197 Section 12 contained language assigning responsibility to the
players for their finances, but it did not assign responsibility for the advi-
191 Williams, 582 F.3d at 869.
192 See Atwater v. NFL Players Ass’n, 626 F.3d 1170, 1174 (11th Cir. 2010).
193 Id.
194 Id. at 1175 (“The parties will use best efforts to establish an in depth, comprehensive
Career Planning Program. The purpose of the program will be to help players enhance their career in
the NFL and make a smooth transition to a second career. The program will also provide information
to players on handling their personal finances, it being understood that players shall be solely re-
sponsible for their personal finances”).
195 Id. at 1174.
196 Id. at 1175.
197 Id.
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sors’ selection or oversight.198 This is in sharp contrast to the Policy
in Williams that warned players that they were responsible for the con-
tents of the supplements they chose to take.199
The NFLPA’s general counsel stated that the Program was part of
the CPP mandated by the CBA and satisfied the requirement to provide
players with information on how to handle their finances.200 This state-
ment is not enough to definitively show that the NFLPA’s duty solely
arose from the CBA. Simply giving a person information on how to han-
dle finances does not relieve a duty to sufficiently investigate a financial
advisor to ensure their trustworthiness.
The NFL then relied on its acknowledgment that it performed back-
ground checks as part of the CBA-mandated CPP.201 The Eleventh Cir-
cuit held that any duty the NFL may have owed to establish
negligence,202 misrepresentation,203 or breach of fiduciary duty204 was
due to the CBA’s provision regarding personal finances. However, com-
pliance with the CPP does not negate any duty owed under Georgia state
law. Therefore, any duty owed by the defendants did not exist solely
from the terms of the CBA. The second part of the Ninth Circuit’s test,
with its in-depth definition of interpretation, would likely have directed
the court to hold that LMRA 301 did not preempt the plaintiffs’ claims.
The Eleventh Circuit stated it would have to consider and consult the
CBA to determine if the defendants’ breached any duty owed by the
defendants to determine negligence.205 However, under the test used in
Dent, merely considering or consulting the language of a CBA is not
interpretation.206
Regarding the misrepresentation claim, the court stated it would
have to interpret the CPP and CBA’s language to ascertain whether the
players reasonably relied on the alleged misrepresentations.207 The court
once again referenced the CPP’s disclaimer regarding the players’ sole
responsibility for their finances.208 It even referenced Georgia law re-
garding disclaimers,209 which was not necessary given that the purpose
of preemption analysis is not to litigate the merits of a claim but to en-
198 Id.
199 Williams v. NFL, 582 F.3d 863, 869 (8th Cir. 2009).
200 Id.
201 Id. at 1182.
202 Id.
203 Id. at 1183.
204 Id. at 1184.
205 Id. at 1181-82.
206 Dent v. NFL, 902 F.3d 1109, 1117 (9th Cir. 2016).




Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 51, Iss. 1 [2021], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol51/iss1/5
2021] Note 45
sure the proper law is applied.210 Also, referencing state law while main-
taining that federal law should resolve the claims is inherently illogical,
as it is analogous to a football referee referencing the rules of baseball to
support a penalty flag. This reasoning in favor of preemption was inap-
propriate using the Ninth Circuit’s test because the mere need to read or
reference a disclaimer is not interpretation.211
Finally, the Eleventh Circuit’s finding that LMRA 301 preempted
the players’ fiduciary duty claims would likely have been different under
the Ninth Circuit’s test. The court held that resolution of the claims de-
pended substantially on the interpretation of the CBA’s language that
“players shall be solely responsible for their personal finances.”212
A purely factual inquiry, using testimony and documents provided
by the parties, could have been conducted to determine if a fiduciary
relationship existed between the plaintiffs and defendants. Further, a re-
sponsibility for one’s own finances does not negate the defendants’ re-
sponsibility to perform adequate background checks on financial
advisors listed by the employer or union. Since all three of the plaintiffs’
claims did not arise solely from the CBA, and resolution of those claims
did not require interpretation, LMRA 301 should not have preempted the
claims in Atwater.
It should not be surprising that a different holding would likely re-
sult from application of the Ninth Circuit’s test to the facts of Atwater
and Williams. The test used in both cases failed to properly incorporate
the Supreme Court’s standard for interpretation of a CBA for the purpose
of determining LMRA 301 preemption.
B. THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S TEST IS MORE COMPLETE THAN THE TESTS
USED IN WILLIAMS AND ATWATER BECAUSE IT RELIES ON
THE SUPREME COURT’S DEFINITION OF
“INTERPRETATION”
The Supreme Court laid the groundwork for analyzing when LMRA
301 should preempt a state-law claim. The Lingle Court addressed a
claim’s independence based on a purely factual inquiry,213 and reiterated
that federal law is the basis for interpretation of a CBA.214
Even if resolution of a claim using either state law or a CBA would
address the same set of facts, the state-law claim is independent of the
210 See Livadas, 512 U.S. at 123-24.
211 See Dent, 902 F.3d at 1116.
212 Atwater, 626 F.3d at 1183.
213 Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, 486 U.S. 399, 407 (1988).
214 Id. at 409.
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CBA for the purposes of LMRA 301 preemption if the claim can be
resolved without interpreting the CBA.215 The Livadas Court held that a
state-law claim is independent of, and therefore not preempted by, a
CBA if the claim can be resolved by “look[ing] to” rather than interpret-
ing the CBA.216 A comparison of the Ninth Circuit test and those used in
Atwater and Williams will show that its definition of interpretation is
more complete because it more closely follows the Supreme Court’s
jurisprudence.
The Eleventh Circuit’s test in Atwater did not define interpretation,
and therefore lacked the thoroughness of the Ninth Circuit’s test. This is
because it did not completely include the Supreme Court’s rulings on the
role of interpretation in assessing LMRA 301 preemption. The Eleventh
Circuit’s test simply stated that if a state-law claim arose from a CBA or
was dependent on the meaning of a CBA, then federal labor-law princi-
ples must be applied to resolve the dispute.217 The Eleventh Circuit did
not include the qualifier substantially dependent in its test, but later used
it when ruling that LMRA 301 preempted the plaintiffs’ claims.218 The
Eleventh Circuit then stated that it would need to consider219 or con-
sult220 the CBA to resolve the claims presented by the plaintiffs.
To consider (or think about)221 and to consult (or refer to)222 equate
to looking to223 a CBA and should not have led to preemption. If a court
needs to think about or refer to the terms of a CBA, this is not interpreta-
tion for the purposes of LMRA 301 preemption analysis. Since the Elev-
enth Circuit did not include the definition of interpretation used by both
the Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit, it concluded that LMRA 301
preemption was unnecessary. It could be argued that the Eleventh Cir-
cuit’s later usage of the term substantially dependent implies that the test
requires more than a look or a reference to a CBA when doing LMRA
301 analysis. However, when dealing with a person’s rights and potential
abuses, it is better to have an explicit definition of interpretation for
215 Id.
216 Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 125 (1994).
217 Atwater v. NFL Players Ass’n, 626 F.3d 1170, 1176-77 (11th Cir. 2010) (quoting Lingle
v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 406 (1988)).
218 Id. at 1185.
219 Id. at 1181.
220 Id. at 1182.
221 The main definition of “consider” is to think carefully about, such as (1) to think of espe-
cially with regard to taking some action, or (2) to take into account. Consider, MERRIAM-WEBSTER,
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/consider (last visited Oct. 4, 2020).
222 The definition of “consult” is (1) to refer to or (2) to ask the advice or opinion of. Consult,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/consider (last visited Oct. 4,
2020).
223 See Livadas, 512 U.S. at 125.
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LMRA 301 analysis. Without an explicit requirement, sports leagues and
other organizations that enter into CBAs with their workers may be able
to circumvent rights granted under state law. Since the Eleventh Circuit
failed to include this explicit definition, its test is less complete when
compared to the test used in Dent. The Eighth Circuit’s test, while closer
to the Ninth Circuit’s, also fails to provide an explicit definition of
interpretation.
The test used by the Eighth Circuit allowed LMRA 301 to preempt
claims based on duties created by a CBA or that required interpretation
of the CBA that was dependent upon an analysis of the agreement.224
The Eighth Circuit’s test mentions interpretation but does not define in-
terpretation. This omission could lead to an inefficient and potentially
unjust analysis because it allows a court to casually reference the lan-
guage of a CBA and rule that LMRA 301 preempts state-law claims. The
Eighth Circuit’s main argument for preemption was a need to examine
the CBA’s language to determine the duty owed by the NFL and its doc-
tors.225 Even if it was necessary to examine the language of the CBA, the
test used by the Eighth Circuit still falls short of the standard laid out by
the Supreme Court. Examination of the terms of a CBA to find any duty
owed would be the same as referring to or looking to the terms of the
CBA, which is not interpretation according to the Supreme Court’s
definition.
Similar to the test used in Atwater, the Eighth Circuit’s test could be
read as impliedly incorporating the Supreme Court’s definition of inter-
pretation that requires a court to do more than to look to the terms of a
CBA. However, any implicit incorporation will fall short because an ex-
plicit requirement provides a firmer foundation for analysis. Without an
explicit requirement defining interpretation, a court can superficially re-
fer to the terms of a CBA without truly determining if resolution of the
claim substantially depends on the CBA. This can deny justice to plain-
tiffs seeking to resolve their claims using state law.
Some may criticize the Ninth Circuit’s definition for being too ex-
plicit and leaving little room for courts to exercise judicial discretion.
However, labor relations are an area of the law where precision is espe-
cially important due to the potential impact on the economy.226 Addition-
ally, workers could be more vulnerable if they do not have the proper
legal recourse to pursue claims. Failure to use a test that relies com-
224 Williams v. NFL, 582 F.3d 863, 881 (8th Cir. 2009) (citing Bogan v. GMC, 500 F.3d 828,
832 (8th Cir. 2007)).
225 Id.
226 See Katia Dmitrieva, GM strike hits broader economy, skewing recession-forecast data,
LOS ANGELES TIMES (Oct. 11, 2019), https://www.latimes.com/business/autos/story/2019-10-11/gm-
strike-hits-broader-economy-skewing-recession-forecast-data.
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pletely on the Supreme Court’s definition of interpretation could allow
the NFL and other industries to violate state law as long as they are
abiding by the provisions of a CBA. Such behavior could threaten
worker protection and industrial harmony. The Ninth Circuit’s test, with
its in-depth definition of “interpretation” based on the Supreme Court’s
jurisprudence, provides a more precise framework for analysis than the
Eighth and Eleventh Circuit Courts’ tests.
CONCLUSION
The physical and financial hardships suffered by Richard Dent and
the plaintiffs in Williams and Atwater show a need for robust LMRA 301
preemption analysis. Plaintiffs should be afforded the opportunity to re-
solve claims that arise from state law and not solely from the terms of a
CBA. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals’ test, if adopted throughout the
federal court system, would meet this need. Application of this test to the
facts of Williams and Atwater showed that it was possible to resolve the
claims without an interpretation of the relevant Collective Bargaining
Agreements. LMRA 301 preemption was therefore unwarranted in those
cases. The test is also an integrated approach based on the Supreme
Court’s jurisprudence compared to the tests used by the Eighth Circuit
and Eleventh Circuit. The Dent test surpasses those used in Williams and
Atwater because it includes an in-depth definition of interpretation based
on the rulings in Lucas, Lueck, Lingle, and Livadas. For these reasons
the Ninth Circuit’s two-pronged test for LMRA 301 preemption analysis,
as stated in Dent v. NFL, should be adopted throughout the federal court
system. This would help achieve Congress’s initial goal of promoting
industrial harmony in adopting LMRA 301. Finally, it would also ensure
that athletes in all major sports leagues can play with confidence, know-
ing that the courts are ready to throw a penalty flag when necessary.
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